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8QWLO WKH 2FWREHU  HFRQRPLF FULVLV WKH 0XVKDUUDI JRYHUQPHQW¶V HFRQRPLF
policies were generally perceived to be a great success.  In fact, Pakistan appeared to 
have one of the best economic growth records in its region.  Based on these 
perceptions, there was widespread optimism that the country might finally break out 
of its post-independence cycle of boom and bust to achieve the type of high sustained 
economic growth that India has been experiencing since the early 1990s.      
 
3ULRUWR0XVKDUUDI3DNLVWDQ¶VHFRQRP\KDGXQGHUSHUIRUPHGZLWKSHUFDSLWDLQFRPH
growth averaging around 1% per annum during the 1990s.  The civilian government 
of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had failed either to check corruption and 
cronyism or to efficiently use public financial resources to boost economic growth, 
contain poverty, and develop human resources.  Instead, there was increasing political 
use of public resources, a bending of rules and regulations to benefit a select few, and 
erosion of institutional accountability2 .  These factors led to high fiscal deficits; 
unsustainable domestic and foreign public debt; a sharp deterioration in the 
distribution of income, and a disturbing rise in the level of unemployment 3  and 
poverty4.  
 
The reforms introduced after the Musharraf administration seized power in October 
ZHUH FOHDUO\ GHVLJQHG WR DGGUHVVPDQ\ RI 3DNLVWDQ¶V HFRQRPLF SUREOHPV  ,Q
particular, they targeted the country's massive poverty, stagnant economic growth, 
deteriorating institutional framework and weak governance structures.  Musharraf's 
regime embraced globalization, structural reforms, and opening the country to 
investment and WUDGH7KHUHVXOWVVXUSULVHGHYHQWKHJHQHUDO¶VPRVWDUGHQWVXSSRUWHUV
as the size of the economy increased by almost 50 percent, with income per-capita up 
by nearly 25 percent.  Cities and towns seemed to be booming, and the country 
managed to recover impressively from the devastating earthquake of 20055.  Toward 
the end of the Musharraf era: 
 
                                                 
1 Robert Looney is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, US. The views 
expressed are entirely those of Professor Robert Looney and should not be construed as reflecting the 
views of the PSRU, Department of Peace Studies or the University of Bradford. 
2 6HH+LOWRQ5RRW³7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI6WDWH)DLOXUH´The Milken Institute Review Spring 
Quarter 2005, pp.65-DQG5REHUW/RRQH\³3DNLVWDQ¶V(FRQRP\$FKLHYHPHQWV3URJUHVV
&RQVWUDLQWVDQG3URVSHFWV´LQ+DUHH]0DOLN3DNLVWDQ)RXQGHU¶V$VSLUDWLRQVDQG7RGD\¶V5HDOLWLHV 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) for a detailed description of this period. 
3 8QHPSOR\PHQWPRUHWKDQGRXEOHGGXULQJWKHV6HH(GZDUG*DUGQHU³:DQWHG0RUH-REV´
F inance and Development,  40:1 (March 2003) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/gard.htm 
4 Detailed in: Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics (Washington: 
World Bank, October 28, 2002). 
5 ³%UHDGDQG%XWWHU3ROLWLFV´The Guardian, February 20, 2008. 
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x The economy grew at rates between 7.0% and 7.5%; 
x The share of industry in GDP rose from 22.6% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2006;  
x The annual percentage growth in industrial value added doubled;  
x The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP increased by three 
percentage points; 
x The services sector posted an impressive performance, with annual growth of 
the value added in services nearly doubling over seven years, and 
x The number of mobile phone subscribers rose to 82 in 1,000 people, up from 2 
in 2000. 
 
Yet by early 2008, the economy was clearly in trouble.  It faced a rapid loss of foreign 
exchange reserves, mounting inflationary pressures and declining rates of growth.  
What had gone wrong?   
Underlying Causes of the C risis 
While some analysts blame external factors, such as rising international commodity 
and oil prices, others argue that long-WHUPGRPHVWLFIDFWRUVFDXVHG3DNLVWDQ¶VVXGGHQ
economic collapse.  SpecificallyDERG\RIDQDO\VLVKHUHGXEEHGWKH³IDLOHGWDNH-off 
VFKRRO´ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH 0XVKDUUDI HFRQRPLF VWUDWHJ\ FRPSRXQGHG PDQ\ SUH-
existing structural problem, creating serious imbalances throughout the economy.  
These imbalances continue to destabilize PakLVWDQ¶VHFRQRP\DQGLWVVRFLHW\DQGDUH
WKHVRXUFHRIPXFKRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQWYLROHQFHDQGGLVFRQWHQW 
 
The leading proponent of this school, Shahid Javed Burki, a former Minister of 
Finance and World Bank Vice President, argues that, despite early positive signs6, the 
Musharraf Government missed a golden opportunity to put the economy on a new 
growth path. 7   :KLOH WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUR-business orientation unleashed 
considerable entrepreneurial activity, it was not accompanied by the on-going 
improvements in governance, economic freedom and financial reform necessary to 
complete the takeoff and achieve sustained growth and development8.  Of particular 
importance were limited improvements and, in some cases, deterioration in the five 
key governance areas monitored by the World Bank: (1) voice and accountability, (2) 
political stability, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law 
and (6) control of corruption9.  
 
7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V HFRQRPLF VWUDWHJ\ WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH XQGHUGevelopment of 
institutional support,10 created an environment increasingly at odds with high rates of 
sustained economic growth.  While the country was able to attract considerable 
amounts of more foreign investment, most of these funds went into import activities 
to satisfy domestic demand, instead of into the export sector.  This pattern of 
investment placed increasing pressure on the balance of payments, making the 
country very vulnerable to external shocks and reductions in external capital flows.  
                                                 
6 6KDKLG-DYHG%XUNL³$VSHFWVRI(FRQRPLF7DNH-RII´Dawn, June 14, 2005. 
7 6KDKLG-DYHG%XUNL³$Q([SDQVLRQDU\%XGJHW´  Dawn, June 21, 2005. 
8 -HQQLIHU%UHPHUDQG-RKQ.DVDUGD´7KH2ULJLQVRI7HUURU,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU86)RUHLJQ3ROLF\´
Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2002, pp. 34-48. 
9 Governance Matters 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 (Washington: World Bank, 
2007). http//info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp      




PakisWDQ¶V HFRQRPLFYXOQHUDELOLW\ LV GHPRQVWUDWHGE\ GDWDRQ LQYHVWPHQWV DQG WKHLU
financing sources.  While the rate of private investment increased by about a third, 
from 13.9% of GDP in 2001-02 to 18.0% in 2006-07, gross national savings declined 
from 19.0% of GDP to 18.7% during the same period.   
 
In addition, the Musharraf administration failed to anticipate the supply bottlenecks, 
particularly in the areas of electricity and gas, which would inevitably result from a 
sharp increase in GDP.  By 2006-7, energy shortages were forcing many firms to 
shorten hours and reduce output, and there was mounting concern that the power 
shortage would affect the productive capacity and export performance of the country.  
In all fairness to the Musharraf administration, the energy crisis was the result of 
long-term supply-side neglect.  Beginning in the early 1980s, the gap between the 
consumption and generation of electricity had steadily expanded, but no augmenting 
measures were initiated 11 .  Not until very recently were tKH FRXQWU\¶V SUREOHPV
examined in any sort comprehensive way12.  
 
Next, the tax base remained narrow and rather inflexible.  The Musharraf government 
failed to realize that major fiscal reforms were needed to pull wide segments of the 
population out of poverty and, thus, prevent growth from widening income 
inequalities13.  Specifically, the income tax system was not adjusted.  As a result, only 
DERXWRI3DNLVWDQ¶VSRSXODWLRQSDLGGLUHFWLQFRPHWD[ZKLOHDSSUR[LPDWHO\
of tax revenue was generated by indirect taxes, which placed most of the tax burden 
on the poor, the salaried class and the business sector.   
  
Not only did the poor pay more than their fair share of taxes, but they benefitted little 
from the Musharraf economic expansion.  Much of the increase in GDP came from 
the sectors which returned high rewards to the investors but in which the share of 
wages was relatively low.  Real estate development was one of the important sectors 
of the economy, as was the modern service sector.  Neither, at least in the context of 
Pakistan, generated employment and income for the poorer segments of the 
population14. 
 
Another area where the Musharraf administration failed to make any progress at 
UHIRUPZDVWKHFRXQWU\¶VVSUDZOLQJPLOLWDU\LQGXVWULDOFRPSOH[RU0LOEus.  Over the 
\HDUV 3DNLVWDQ¶V PLOLWDU\ KDG H[SDQGHG LWV KROGLQJV RI LQGXVWULHV SURSHUWLHV DQG
foundations.  These properties guaranteed the armed forces both organizational 
autonomy and a regular flow of resources from the public and private sectors ± often 
to the enrichment of senior officers, both active-duty and retired.  It is estimated that 
the military controlled 12% of state land, or 11.58 million acres.  Much of this land 
was rented at very low fees to military personnel.  The estimated total wealth of this 
sector may have been as high as $100 billion.  From an economic perspective, these 
DFWLYLWLHVDUHQRWKLQJOLNHWKHOHDGLQJLQGXVWULHVLQ5RVWRZ¶VWDNH-off stage.  Instead, 
                                                 
11 Zia-ul-+DT6DUKDGL³1HHGIRUD9LDEOH(QHUJ\3ROLF\´ The News, Business and F inance Review, 
November 19, 2007. 
12 5REHUW/RRQH\³(QHUJ\DQGWKH3DNLVWDQL(FRQRP\$Q([SORUDWRU\$QDO\VLVWR´LQ5REHUW
+DWKDZD\HG)XHOLQJWKH)XWXUH0HHWLQJ3DNLVWDQ¶V(QHUJ\1HHGVLQWKHst Century (Washington: 









existed almost since independence.  The problem was compounded by a rapid 
increase in population from 32 million in 1947 to 165 million in 2008.  Even so, Burki 
argues:  
 
³7KLV LQFUHDVH LQ SRSXODWLRQ FRXOG KDYH EHHQ WXUQHG LQWR DQ HFRQRPLF DVVHW
had a determined effort been made to invest in its development.  This was not 
GRQH  1R JRYHUQPHQW LQ 3DNLVWDQ¶V  \HDU KLVWRU\PDGH VRFLDO DQG KXPDQ 
development its priority.  The consequence is that Pakistan today has a very 
large population which has low levels of literacy and very poor skill 
development16´ 
 
,Q VXP 3DNLVWDQ¶V FXUUHQW HFRQRPLFPHOWGRZQZDV SUHFLSLWDWHG E\ EDVLF VWUXFWXUDO
problems that have repeatedly interacted to create balance of payments crises.  To 
EHJLQZLWK WKH3DNLVWDQL HFRQRP\ LV KHDYLO\GHSHQGHQWRQ LPSRUWV 7KHFRXQWU\¶V
imports always surpass its exports, many of which consist of traditional items of poor 
quality due to 3DNLVWDQ¶VSRRUKXPDQFDSLWDOGHYHORSPHQW 1H[W3DNLVWDQ¶V WD[-to-
GDP ratio is 10%, far below the average 17% of developing countries.  Even more 
telling, less than two percent of the population is covered by the tax net.  Thus, the 
Musharraf government¶V KXJH H[SHQGLWXUHV RQ GHEW VHUYLFLQJ GHIHQVH DQG FXUUHQW
spending resulted in fiscal deficits that reached 7.4% of GDP by FY200817.   
 
6LPSO\ SXW0XVKDUUDI¶V SROLFLHV PDGH 3DNLVWDQ GDQJHURXVO\ GHSHQGHQW RQ IRUHLJQ
FDSLWDO  7KH FRXQWU\¶V SROLWLFDO LQVWDbility and lack of significant progress in 
governance and economic reforms further increased its vulnerability to a fall-off in 
foreign capital.  By 2007, it found itself in a position where any major reduction in 
foreign capital inflows would precipitate an economic crisis.18.  
 
In addition to this pre-existing set of structural conditions, specific economic policies 
pursued under President Pervez Musharraf helped trigger the October 2008 crisis19: 
 
x High Consumption.  Growth was based on a consumption-led strategy aided 
by generous aid inflows, rising asset prices and loose monetary policy; 
 
x Inflation.  A by-product of the high-consumption strategy was an extremely 
high inflation rate, which rose steadily after March 2007 to eventually reach 
25%.  While rising global food and oil prices exacerbated the trend, essential 
corrective measures ± notably through tighter monetary policy ± were delayed, 
and 
 
                                                 
15 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside 3DNLVWDQ¶V0LOLWDU\(FRQRP\ (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 
242. 
16 6KDKLG-DYHG%XUNL³&DXVHVRIWKH&ULVLV´Dawn, February 12, 2008 
17 Iftikhar A. Lodhi, 3DNLVWDQ¶V(FRQRPLF&ULVLVDQGWKH,0)%DLORXW3DFNDJH, Institute of South 
Asian Studies, ISAS Insights, No. 42, December 9, 2008, p. 3. 




x Current account deficit.  The current account deficit widened during the last 
WKUHH\HDUVRI0XVKDUUDI¶VUXOHas consumption growth was accompanied by a 
consistent growth in imports.  This deficit was met with stable flows of 
remittances, aid and portfolio investment, together with strong export 
performance.  However, excessive dependence on foreign capital inflows 
made the current account highly vulnerable. 
 
These factors contributed to a slowing of growth in 2007.  In most countries, the 
slowing of growth usually does not cause political problems, unless gains from 
previous growth have been inequitably distributed.  Unfortunately, the Musharraf 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUR-business policy bias, lack of democratic feed-back and 
authoritarian style of policy-making were also not conducive to equitable growth and 
broad-based development20. 
 
While no detailed studies of income distribution are available for the last several years 
RI0XVKDUUDI¶V UHJLPH%XUNL HVWLPDWHV WKDW DURXQGPLOOLRQ3DNLVWDQLVEHQHILWWHG
from the economic growth and restructuring, 25 million would have entered the 
system had it not been disrupted, and 45 million were completely ignored 21 . 
Furthermore, he notes that regional inequality emerged from the Musharraf era, 
whose economic benefits were largely confined to the central and northern Punjab and 
large cities, such as Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad and Gujranwala22. 
 
The failed-WDNHRII VFKRRO FRQWHQGV WKDW 3DNLVWDQ¶V SROLWLFDO KLVWRU\ VXJJHVWV WKDW
economic developments can create great political instability. For example, there was a 
widespread perception that the benefits of the extraordinary economic expansion that 
occurred under President Ayub Khan in the 1960s went to a very limited number of 
prominent families23.  The authoritarian growth model that developed during this time 
created such a wide disparity of income between East and West Pakistan that it 
HYHQWXDOO\UHVXOWHGLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VEUHDNXS6LPLODUDOWKRXJKOHVVGUDPDWLFFKDQJHV
took place in the late 1980s at the end of the Zia authoritarian era.  In both these 
examples, the aggrieved resorted to violence to achieve their goals24.  Fortunately for 
Pakistan, they simply voted in 2008. 
 
$IWHUWKHFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWKHDGHGE\WKH3DNLVWDQ3HRSOHV¶3DUW\DVVXPHGSRZHU
in February 2008, wrangling over cabinet appointments left the finance and economy 
post unfilled for successive months.  The failure to take corrective measures 
exacerbated the crisis25: 
 
x Fiscal shortfalls.  The global spike in oil prices increased the share of oil to 
38% of the total import bill for the twelve months ending July 2008, as 
compared to 30% for the same period the previous year.  In the July±October 
quarter alone, the oil import bill was 35% higher than for the same period the 
year before. However, this increase was not passed on to consumers, which 
resulted in higher spending on subsidies. Rising oil prices, together with 
                                                 
20 6KDKLG-DYHG%XUNL³$ULWKPHWLFRI'LVFRQWHQW´Dawn, December 11, 2007. 
21 6KDKLG-DYHG%XUNL³5HDFKLQJWKH'LVDGYDQWDJHG´Dawn, December 18, 2007. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Root, op. cit. p. 68. 




higher public sector spending, raised the budget deficit to more than 75% of 
GDP. 
x State Bank of Pakistan borrowing.  To meet the financing gap, the government 
made use of large-scale borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).  
Between June 1 and November 8, 2008, new borrowing totaled 4.6 billion 
dollars, which both increased government debt and inflationary pressures. 
x External deterioration.  Slippages on the external account also continued.  
Even as the import bill increased, foreign exchange reserves dwindled due to 
falling portfolio inflows.  The country witnessed massive capital flight in 
September, October and November, pushing the currency downwards and 
fuelling expectations of default. 
C risis Management 
Plan A26.  In September and October 2008, Pakistan sought assistance from a number 
of sources, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, The 
8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V 'HSDUWPHQW IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW '),' DQG WKH
Islamic Development Bank (IDB)27.  The ADB agreed to provide Pakistan with a 
PLOOLRQORDQ³WRDGGUHVVKDUPGRQHWRSRRUIDPLOLHVDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRP\
by unprecedented international fuel price hikes28 ´  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH :RUOG %DQN
originally offered $1.4 billion in assistance29.  However, the combined ADB and 
:RUOG %DQN ORDQV ZHUH LQVXIILFLHQW WR DGGUHVV 3DNLVWDQ¶V EDODQFH RI SD\PHQWV
shortfall. 
 
Plan B. Pakistan next attempted to secure direct commitments from national 
governments.  In the fall of 2008, a group of nations met President Zardari to discuss 
ways to aid Pakistan with its political, economic and security problems. Calling 
themselves the Friends of Pakistan, the informal coalition contained representatives 
from 11 nations, including China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as the 
European Union, the United Nations and the IMF.  While Zardari reportedly sought 
$100 billion in aid, he left his two meetings with the group with no commitment of 
financial support30. 
 
Zardari also traveled to Saudi Arabia in search of funding.  Saudi Arabia was 
reportedly asked for up to $6 billion in deferred payments for petroleum imports31, 
which would free up capital to pay other international obligations.  Apparently, the 
Pakistani government felt that, if the deferral was granted, IMF assistance would not 
be required.  However, the visit ended with no public announcement of Saudi support.  
In general, recent Saudi relations with Pakistan had been cool for several reasons, 
LQFOXGLQJ3DNLVWDQ¶VTXHVWIRUDQRLOIDFLOLW\LQ,UDQ 
                                                 
26 The events of October and November 2008 draw heavily on Michael Martin and K. Alan Kronstadt, 
3DNLVWDQ¶V&DSLWDO&ULVLV,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU863ROLF\ (Washington: CRS Report for Congress, 
November 21, 2008). 
27 0XEDUHN=HE.KDQ³%LOOLRQ1HHGHG:LWKLQ'D\VWR%XLOG8S5HVHUYHV5HFRXUVHWR,0)
/DVW2SWLRQ´Dawn, October 23, 2008. 
28 ³$'%3URYLGHV3DNLVWDQZLWK0LOOLRQWR$FFHOHUDWH(FRQRPLF7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ´$'%SUHVV
release, September 30, 2008. 
29 ³:%WR*LYH3DNLVWDQ%LOOLRQ7KLV<HDU´'DLO\7LPHV2FWREHU 
30 1LVVDU+RDWK³8$(WR+RVW3DNLVWDQ%DLORXW7DONV1H[W0RQWK´Emirates business 24/7, October 
27, 2008 





China, historically a friend of Pakistan with huge foreign reserves, also declined to 
PDNHDQ\PDMRUFDVKLQIXVLRQ3UHVLGHQW=DUGDUL¶V2FWREHU&KLQDYLVLW\LHOGHG
only US$500 million, together with promises of future investment and trade 
opportunities. Clearly, China was concerned with its own economy, which faced a 
major decline in exports due to the global recession. The Chinese also noted that they 
ZHUH ³QR ORQJHU LQFOLQHG WR JUDQW FDVK RXWULJKWZLWKRXW VWUXFWXUDO UHIRUPV IURP WKH
receiving government32´ 
 
Finally, the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ZDV FULWLFDO RI ,VODPDEDG¶V FRPPLWPHQW DQG FDSDFLW\ WR
fight militants engaged in insurgency against US-led forces in Afghanistan.  Past 
failure of U.S. aid programs to Pakistan added to its reluctance to fund a major bail-
out.  Instead, the United States threw its weight behind the Friends of Pakistan group, 
which reportedly required Pakistan to get an IMF loan approval to insure careful 
management of the economy and provide greater investor confidence. In turn, the 
group would aid Pakistan in developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to 
its security, development and institutional issues. 
 
Plan C. Lacking other funding sources, Pakistan had little choice but to formally 
request IMF assistance, an action that was clearly the last resRUW  3DNLVWDQ¶V
UHOXFWDQFH WRDFFHSW IRUPDO ,0)KHOSZDVGXHERWK WR WKHFRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\RISRRU
relations with the Fund33 DQGWKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDW WKH)XQG¶VXVXDODXVWHULW\PHDVXUHV
would result in a marked economic slow-down and increased unemployment. 
Nonetheless, by November 15, 2008, Pakistan had reached a tentative agreement with 
the IMF to borrow $7.6 billion over 23 months34.   
 
:KLOH WKH ,0) SDFNDJHZLOO VLJQLILFDQWO\ KHOS WR UHDVVXUH LQYHVWRUV WKDW 3DNLVWDQ¶V
government is committed to a path of prudent economic policy, it will bring near-term 
economic distress to the country and pose major implementation difficulties. In 
general, the package is based on locking into place key policy commitments, which 
include cutting the budget deficit; increasing the tax-GDP ratio; removing fuel 
subsidies; revising interest rates upwards to fight inflation, and promising not to 
borrow from the SBP.  The fiscal and monetary tightening come at a time when other 
Asian economies are boosting government spending, loosening monetary policy and 
cutting taxes to support growth as external markets contract due to the global 
recession ± a luxury the Pakistan can no longer afford35. 
 
                                                 
32 -DQH3HUOH]³5HEXIIHGE\&KLQD3DNLVWDQ0D\6HHN,0)$LG´New York Times, October 19, 2008. 
33 5REHUW/RRQH\³)DLOHG(FRQRPLF7DNH-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: conceptualizing a Proper 
Role for U.S. Assistance, Asia Survey 44:6 (November/December 2004), pp. 771-793. 
34 Details of the IMF program can be found in Pakistan: Request for Stand-By Agreement²Staff Report 
:DVKLQJWRQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG'HFHPEHU3DNLVWDQ¶VUHYLVHGLQWHQWLRQVXQGHUWKH
program are outlined in: Pakistan: Letter of Intent, Supplementary Memorandum on Economic and 
Financial Policies and addendum to the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (Washington: 
International Monetary fund, March 16, 2009). 
35 For an overview of the cRXQWU\¶VPDFURHFRQRPLFG\QDPLFVVHH-HVXV)HOLSHDQG-RVHSK/LPAn 






vicious circle that will be extremely difficult to reverse. While exogenous price 
VKRFNVSOD\HGDUROHWKHFRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQWLQIODWLRQDU\SUHVVXUHVODUJHO\UHVXOWHGIURP
increased government borrowing from the SBP over the last several years.  However, 
measures like revoking subsidies and increasing sales tax, required under the IMF 
program to arrest the growing fiscal deficit, may fuel inflation further.  The large 
external account deficit and the slowdown of capital inflows in response to increased 
internal instability are also exerting downward pressure on the Rupee36.  The net 
HIIHFW RI WKH 5XSHH¶V GHSUHFLDWLRQ LQ D KLJK-inflation environment has been to 
exacerbate price increases by raiding import costs.  At the same time, reduced demand 
due to the woUOGUHFHVVLRQFRXOGFXUE3DNLVWDQ¶VH[SRUWJURZWKWKURXJKRXWDQG
into 2010.   
 
The results of this vicious circle of inflation-Rupee devaluation, rising costs and lost 
competitiveness are likely to be continued lower than expected revenue generation 
and higher than anticipated current account deficits.  While an expanded U.S. aid 
program may dampen these forces, it is unlikely the U.S. will underwrite a painless 
transition37. 
 
7KHHFRQRPLFLPSDFWRI3DNLVWDQ¶VGHIHQVHH[SHQGLWXUHVUHLQIRUFHVWKLVYLFLRXs circle.  
In countries with weak institutional foundations²especially in areas of governance, 
like voice/accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law, and control of corruption²increasing defense expenditures 
beyond a certain threshold will likely lower the rate of economic growth.  According 
to the World Bank, Pakistan ranks well below the 50th percentile in all these areas 
when compared to other countries.  As a result, empirical research38 suggests that the 
LQFUHDVHVLQ3DNLVWDQ¶VDOUHDG\KLJKGHIHQVHH[SHQGLWXUHVUHTXLUHGE\WKHGHWHULRUDWLQJ
security situation will strain the economy and likely result in increased corruption, 
government inefficiency and the crowding out of private sector activity.  
 
The continued deterioration in fiscal and external accounts suggests that Pakistan will 
experience several more years of slow economic growth before its economy again 
H[SDQGV DW UDWH RI  DQG DERYH  ,Q WKH PHDQWLPH EHFDXVH RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V
continued current account deficit and inability to attractive substantial capital inflows, 
it will require further injections from the IMF and other donors simply to prevent a 
new balance of payments crisis. Unfortunately, the ongoing IMF program will be 
confined largely tR WUHDWLQJ WKH V\PSWRPV RI 3DNLVWDQ¶V ERRP-and-bust pattern of 
growth.  There will be few funds available for alleviating the fundamental causes of 
3DNLVWDQ¶V HFRQRPLF SOLJKW²low rates of human capital, energy/infrastructure 
shortfalls, and institutional underdevelopment.  
                                                 
36 The Pakistan rupee depreciated by 13.7% against the US dollar in 2008, reflecting investors' fears of 
poor political prospects, rising prices and slowing economic growth. However, the rate of depreciation 
slowed following the finalization of the IMF package, falling to 7.3% quarter on quarter in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, from 12.8% in the third quarter. 
37 $VRIHDUO\$SULOWKH86FRQJUHVVZDVVWLOOGHEDWLQJWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VSURSRVHGELOOLRQDLG
package for Pakistan.  
38 5REHUW/RRQH\DQG5REHUW0F1DE³3DNLVWDQ¶V(FRQRPLFDQG6HFXULW\'LOHPPD([SDQGHG'HIHQVH





3DNLVWDQ¶V SURFHVV RI PDFURHFRQRPLF DGMXVWPHQW ZLOO SURYH OHQJWK\ DQG GLIILFXOW
while increasing economic distress among ordinary citizens.  Will the process set up a 
repeat of the economic malaise of the 1990s?  Will the country be forced to reduce its 
defense expenditures for the sake of economic stability and job creation?  If so, what 
happens to the security situation?  Could deteriorating conditions result in a collapse 
of the civilian government?  Clearly the situation is dire, and the next few years will 
be trying ones for the country. 
 
 
